The response of labour taxation to changes in government debt by Holm-Hadulla, Fédéric et al.
WORKING PAPER SERIES
NO 1307 / MARCH 2011
by Fédéric Holm-Hadulla, 
Nadine Leiner-Killinger
and Michal Slavík
THE RESPONSE OF 
LABOUR TAXATION
TO CHANGES IN 
GOVERNMENT DEBTWORKING PAPER SERIES
NO 1307 / MARCH 2011
THE RESPONSE OF LABOUR 
TAXATION TO CHANGES 
IN GOVERNMENT DEBT1
by Fédéric Holm-Hadulla, Nadine Leiner-Killinger 
and Michal Slavík2 
1   The authors would like to thank Cristina Checherita-Westphal, Davide Furceri, Bernhard Manzke, participants of the ESCB Working Group 
on Public Finance 2010 Workshop in Krakow and an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Roberta de Stefani 
2   All authors: European Central Bank, Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany; 
nadine.leiner-killinger@ecb.europa.eu and 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from http://www.ecb.europa.eu or from the Social Science 
Research Network electronic library at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=1768746.
NOTE: This Working Paper should not be reported as representing 
the views of the European Central Bank (ECB). 
The views expressed are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily reflect those of the ECB.





and Krzysztof Bankowski provided excellent research assistance.
e-mails: federic.holm-hadulla@ecb.europa.eu, 
michal.slavik@ecb.europa.eu© European Central Bank, 2011
Address
Kaiserstrasse 29
60311 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Postal address
Postfach 16 03 19
60066 Frankfurt am Main, Germany
Telephone




+49 69 1344 6000 
All rights reserved. 
Any reproduction, publication and 
reprint in the form of a different 
publication, whether printed or produced 
electronically, in whole or in part, is 
permitted only with the explicit written 
authorisation of the ECB or the authors. 
Information on all of the papers published 
in the ECB Working Paper Series can be 









1 Introduction  6
2  Data and stylised facts  8
3 Empirical  model  13
4  Results and discussion  15






Working Paper Series No 1307
March 2011
Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between government debt and labour
taxation for a panel of 18 EU countries over the period 1979-2008. The econometric
estimates point to a statistically signicant and economically relevant positive
response of labour taxation to changes in the general government debt and interest
expenditure-to-GDP ratios. The results are robust across a range of econometric
specications and labour tax indicators.
Keywords: Debt, labour taxes, scal adjustment
JEL codes: H2, H24, H63, J22.5
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The global nancial and economic crisis has led to rapidly rising debt ratios in
most EU countries. While many governments have already adopted ambitious scal
consolidation packages in response, these plans would only mark the beginning of a
prolonged period of budgetary restraint necessary to bring back debt ratios to pre-
crisis levels. Assessing the potential repercussions of such a restrictive scal stance is
by no means trivial. Besides the expected scale and timing of scal contraction, the
economic implications depend on its composition. In particular, the feedback eects of
scal adjustment on economic growth may dier substantially depending on whether it
is predominantly revenue- or expenditure-based and which specic spending or revenue
items are mainly aected. Hence, in order to assess the potential impact of the expected
scal consolidation episode on general economic performance it is useful to observe key
regularities of scal adjustment in the past with regard to individual budgetary items.
Against this background, this paper analyses the response of labour taxation to
changes in general government gross debt and interest payments in EU countries. As
documented by a large body of literature, labour taxation distorts incentives to work
and to accumulate human capital,
Thus, the burden of debt on potential growth is higher if governments meet additional
nancing requirements in a way that exerts negative supply-side eects on labour
markets. At the same time, the theoretical literature on budgetary decision mak-
ing suggests that governments might favour revenue-based scal consolidation over
expenditure restraint since tapping the `common pool' of public funds is less costly
from a political perspective than cutting specic spending programmes. Consequently,
governments tend to respond to exogenous shocks to their scal position by adjusting
tax rates even if this incurs long-run costs from an economic perspective.
The analysis is based on a panel of 18 EU countries over the period 1979-2008.
As measures for labour taxation we use the indicators `tax burden' and `tax wedge'
as provided by the OECD in their annual Taxing Wages study. Given the drawbacks
of the commonly used estimators for dynamic panel models with unobserved hetero-
geneity, the analysis uses a range of econometric procedures, including a least squares
a bias-corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDVC) estimator.
Our econometric estimates show that, indeed, rising (falling) debt and interest
expenditure ratios go
one percentage point increase in the debt ratio (interest payments ratio) is
estimated to raise the tax burden of an average single earner (as dened in the OECD
Taxing Wages study) by 0.03%-0.04% (0.16%-0.17%) in the subsequent year and by
0.13% The corresponding eects for the debt ratio
(interest expenditure ratio) on the tax burden of an average one-earner family amount
to 0.02% (0.22%-0.23%) in the subsequent year and to 0.12%-0.18% (1.30%-1.76%) in
the long-run. Especially for the interest expenditure ratio, the associated eects on an
average
the same sign and is similar in magnitude.
Non-technical summary
distortions with higher tax rates. which intensify
dummy variable (LSDV) estimator, a generalised method of moments (GMM) esti
mator, and
-
along with increases (decreases) in labour taxes in subsequent
years.  A
(0.71%-0.94%) in the long-run.
household's net income appear economically relevant. The response of the tax
wedges has6
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1 Introduction
The global nancial and economic crisis has led to rapidly rising debt ratios in most
EU countries.1 While many governments have already adopted ambitious scal consol-
idation packages in response, these plans would only mark the beginning of a prolonged
period of budgetary restraint necessary to bring back debt ratios to pre-crisis levels.
Assessing the potential repercussions of such a restrictive scal stance is by no means
trivial. Besides the scale and timing of scal contraction, the economic implications
depend on its composition. In particular, the feedback eects of scal adjustment on
economic growth may dier substantially across individual budgetary items. For ex-
ample, a number of studies nd that tax based scal consolidation tends to be more
contractionary than expenditure-based scal adjustment (see e.g. IMF 2010), with
some analyses suggesting that declines in expenditures are even accompanied by an
expansion of economic activity (see e.g. Alesina and Perotti, 1995 and Alesina and
Ardagna, 2010).2 Furthermore, this literature documents that both the implications
for growth and the prospects of achieving sustainable improvements in scal positions
depend on which specic tax rate is raised and which type of government spending is
cut (see e.g. Hauptmeier , 2007 and Uhlig and Trabandt, 2009). Hence, in order
to assess the potential impact of the expected scal consolidation episode on general
economic performance it is useful to observe key regularities of scal adjustment in the
past with regard to individual budgetary items.
Against this background, this paper analyses the response of labour taxation to
changes in general government gross debt for a panel of EU countries. As documented
by a large body of literature, labour taxation distorts incentives to work and to accu-
mulate human capital, distortions which intensify with higher tax rates.3 Thus, the
burden of debt on potential growth is higher if governments meet additional nancing
requirements in a way that exerts negative supply-side eects on labour markets. At
the same time, the theoretical literature on budgetary decision making suggests that
1For more details on euro area scal policies in the crisis see van Riet et al. (2010).
2See also, for example, Afonso, Nickel and Rother (2006), Afonso and Alegre (2008), and Coenen,
Mohr and Straub (2008).
3Theoretically, the eect of higher labour taxes on individual labour supply is a priori ambiguous.
On the one hand, higher labour taxes may decrease disposable income, therefore decreasing leisure
and increasing the supply of labour (income eect). On the other hand, labour supply may decrease,
increasing leisure, which is now cheaper in relative terms (substitution eect). However, if in general
equilibrium taxes are used to fund benets such as unemployment insurance, negative income eects are
cancelled out by the positive income eect of benet recipients, while the substitution eect goes in the
same direction - reducing labour supply. Empirically, tax and benet systems are found to be a major
explanatory factor of labour supply developments, particularly for those population groups with a large
labour supply elasticity such as, e.g. persons with low incomes or second earners. See for example,
Nickell (1997), Nickell and Layard (1999), Nickell at al. (2005) and ECB (2008). Furthermore, several
studies analyse the impact of the labour tax indicators used in this paper on economic conditions. In
one of the seminal contributions to this literature Tullio (1987) nds a negative relationship between
these labour tax indicators and economic growth and employment for several OECD countries over the
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governments might favour revenue-based scal consolidation over expenditure restraint
since tapping the `common pool' of public funds is less costly from a political perspec-
tive than cutting specic spending programmes.4 Consequently, governments tend to
respond to exogenous shocks to their scal position by adjusting tax rates even if this
incurs long-run costs from an economic perspective.
For a panel of 18 EU countries from 1979-2008, our econometric estimates show
that, indeed, rising (falling) debt and interest expenditure ratios go along with in-
creases (decreases) in labour taxes in subsequent years. In particular, a one percentage
point increase in the debt ratio (interest payments ratio) is estimated to raise the tax
burden of an average single earner (as dened in the OECD Taxing Wages study) by
long-run. The corresponding eects for the debt ratio (interest expenditure ratio) on
the tax burden of an average one-earner family amount to 0.02% (0.22%-0.23%) in the
subsequent year and to 0.12%-0.18% (1.30%-1.76%) in the long-run. Especially for the
interest expenditure ratio, the associated eects on an average household's net income
appear economically relevant.
similar in magnitude.
Our results are in line with both theoretical and empirical analyses pointing to a
positive relation between tax rates and government debt: Barro (1979) suggests that
governments, while aiming to minimise the inter-temporal excess burden via uniform
taxation, would adjust tax rates in response to changes in permanent government ex-
penditure, e.g. deriving from debt service.5 This hypothesis received empirical support
in studies by Sahasakul (1986) and Kenny and Toma (1997) both of which establish
a positive relationship between the marginal tax rates from the federal income and
social security tax and the debt ratio in the US. Similarly, Bohn (1998) nds a positive
response of the US budget balance to preceding changes in the debt ratio. While pre-
vious literature has analysed revenue-based scal adjustments in EU countries,6 this
paper is the rst one to conduct a separate analysis of the response in various labour
tax indictors to changes in government debt.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data underlying this
study and reviews some stylised facts concerning developments in labour taxation and
debt ratios. Section 3 motivates and describes the econometric model and Section 4
presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
4See Weingast et al. (1981) and von Hagen and Harden (1995) for the seminal contributions.
5Note that in Barro (1979), a positive relation between distortive taxation and permanent changes in
funding requirements derives from the government's optimisation problem. However, since expenditure
is exogenous and the distortive tax is the only revenue source, the model does not yield normative
implications for the optimal composition of scal adjustment.
6For a survey of the literature and further empirical evidence see European Commission (2007).
For related evidence see Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005). For an in-depth study of the dynamics of both
revenue- and expenditure-based scal adjustment in the context of US municipalities see B uttner and
Wildasin (2006).
0.03%-0.04% (0.16%-0.17%) in the subsequent year and by 0.13% (0.71%-0.94%) in the
The response of the tax wedges has the same sign and
is8
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2 Data and stylised facts
Our dataset consists of a panel of annual observations that cover 18 EU countries over
the period 1979-2008.7 As measures for labour taxation we use the indicators `tax bur-
den' and `tax wedge' as provided by the OECD in their annual Taxing Wages study.
The tax burden captures personal income tax and employee social security contribu-
tions net of cash benets as a percentage of average gross earnings. The tax wedge
captures the dierence between total labour costs to the employer and the correspond-
ing net-take home pay of a worker at average earnings as a percentage of total labour
costs. Both measures are computed for a representative worker with average income.
In this regard, the time series exhibit a methodological change in the year 2000 as the
tax indicators have been calculated on the basis of two dierent denitions of \average
income". Under the old denition, income is measured as the average earnings of a
manual full-time worker in the manufacturing sector (`average production worker').
Under the new concept, this income measure has been extended to capture not only
As a consequence, the OECD provides
two series for the labour tax indictors, i.e. (a) one for 1979-2004 under the old denition
with a biyearly frequency and (b) one for 2000-2008 under the new denition of
average income at an annual frequency (for further methodological explanations
see OECD 2006, 2009).
We merge these two datasets, using the information from (a) up to 1999 and from
(b) for the rest of the sample period,8 and interpolate missing observations in every
second year in the period 1979-1999. For this interpolation we rst derive a broad
proxy for average tax rates on labour income by dividing revenues from direct taxes
on households by GDP; in a second step we compute the ratios between the labour
tax burden (tax wedges) and this average tax rate for the years where both variables
are available; nally we replace missing values with the simple average of the ratios in
the two adjacent periods multiplied with the average tax rate in the current period.
Furthermore, to avoid that the methodological dierence between the old and new def-
inition of the average income worker leads to a structural break in the time series, we
backcast the data for each labour tax indicator for the period 1979-1999 by applying
7The analysis covers those EU countries for which comparable OECD data on labour taxes were
available, including Belgium (BEL), Czech Republic (CZE), Denmark (DNK), Germany (DEU), Ire-
land (IRL), Greece (GRC), Spain (ESP), France (FRA), Hungary (HUN), Italy (ITA), Luxembourg
(LUX), the Netherlands (NLD), Austria (AUT), Poland (POL), Portugal (PRT), Finland (FIN), Swe-
den (SWE) and the United Kingdom (GBR). For the labour tax indicators several observations are
missing. In particular, for France tax wedge data start only in 1995 because employers' social contri-
butions were not reported for the period 1979-1993. Time series on tax wedges for the Czech Republic
and Poland start in 1993 and for Hungary in 1995. The interpolation of missing observations (see
below) had to be slightly adjusted for Greece, Luxembourg and Portugal where comparable OECD
data on direct taxes paid by households were not available. Thus, the interpolation was conducted
using all direct taxes instead.
8This change in methodology does not aect the results of our empirical analysis (see section 3).
manual workers but also non-manual workers.9
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1307
March 2011
the growth rates of the respective variable obtained from (a) to the value for 2000
obtained from (b). Of the eight household types provided by the OECD - diering
by household income and composition - we look at two basic types of households: a
single earner and a one-earner family with two children at income levels amounting
to 100% of average income, as only for these household types the OECD provides the
long historical time series.
Table 1: Debt ratios and labour tax indicators over the last three decades
Country Debt Tax burden Tax wedges
in % of GDP single one-earner single one-earner
earner family earner family
change level change level change level change level change level
79-08 2008 79-08 2008 79-08 2008 79-08 2008 79-08 2008
AUT 28.8 62.6 7.8 33.9 12.2 20.5 10.3 48.8 13.9 38.4
BEL 24.0 89.8 16.5 42.5 17.0 22.6 7.8 56.0 6.0 40.8
CZE 17.5 30.0 0.9 23.6 -12.2 -7.1 1.0 43.4 -8.8 20.6
DEU 39.3 66.0 9.2 42.7 -0.8 24.1 9.5 52.0 1.9 36.4
DNK 2.6 34.2 0.8 40.9 -1.2 29.1 0.7 41.2 -1.4 29.5
ESP 25.1 39.7 2.2 19.0 -0.8 11.2 0.4 37.8 -1.7 31.8
FIN 23.0 34.2 0.1 30.0 4.2 23.1 1.5 43.5 5.0 38.0
FRA 46.5 67.5 6.0 27.8 10.2 17.6 -1.2 49.3 1.7 42.1
GBR -1.2 52.0 -6.9 25.6 -6.8 19.1 -6.3 32.8 -5.8 26.9
GRC 76.7 99.2 12.6 26.3 36.5 26.6 15.0 42.4 32.4 42.7
HUN 17.9 72.9 2.6 38.3 4.2 24.6 -0.5 54.1 0.0 43.9
IRL -23.6 43.9 -13.5 14.6 -18.1 -4.7 -11.0 22.9 -14.9 5.5
ITA 46.8 106.1 9.0 29.3 0.6 15.5 1.0 46.5 -7.7 36.0
LUX 9.6 13.7 1.1 27.2 5.0 1.0 0.1 35.9 -4.6 12.8
NLD 15.3 58.2 3.5 36.1 6.2 28.1 2.7 45.0 5.1 38.0
POL 3.8 47.2 10.6 28.6 11.3 21.5 -6.0 39.7 -6.7 33.7
PRT 31.8 66.3 4.6 22.8 -5.6 9.9 6.3 37.6 -0.8 27.2
SWE 3.5 38.3 -10.8 26.7 -9.3 19.1 -6.7 44.6 -5.3 38.9
Mean 21.5 56.8 3.1 29.8 2.9 16.8 1.4 43.0 0.5 32.4
Note: For countries for which labour tax indicators are available only for a shorter period, the changes refer to the respective
start date (see text). The tax burden is dened as personal income tax and employee social security contributions at average
earnings as a percentage of gross earnings. The tax wedge is dened as the dierence between total labour cost to the employer
and the corresponding net take home pay of a worker with average earnings as a percentage of total labour costs. For the
denition of country codes see footnote 7.
Table 1 provides information on past developments in labour taxation and
gross
general
government debt ratios. Both government debt ratios and labour taxation as
measured by tax burdens and tax wedges rose between 1979 and 2008 at the sample
average (by 21.5 percentage points to 56.8% of GDP).9 Over these 29 years, debt ratios
fell only in Ireland (by almost 24 percentage points to 44% of GDP in 2008) and the
UK (by slightly more than 1 percentage point to 52% of GDP in 2008). In all other
9Since a full set of data for Czech Republic and Poland (Hungary) is only available from 1996 (2000)
onwards the respective dierences are computed relative to these years. Likewise for Luxembourg
labour tax indicators could only be computed from 1990 onwards and for France, tax wedges are only
available from 1995 onwards.10
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countries, debt ratios rose, with the strongest increases observed in Greece (by almost
77 percentage points to about 99% of GDP), Italy (by 47 percentage points to 106%
of GDP) and France (by 47 percentage points to 68% of GDP). At the same time, in
the majority of countries, labour taxation increased. Only in Ireland, Sweden and the
United Kingdom all labour tax indicators considered here were lower in 2008 than at
the beginning of the respective sample period.
The ensuing empirical analysis tests the relationship between debt and labour tax-
ation.
tax burdens and debt ratios against time for each country.10 Upon inspection, in some
countries debt ratios and labour tax burdens seem to have evolved in a strikingly similar
manner over time. For example, the marked increase in Finland's debt ratio from 1991
onwards was followed by a distinct switch from declining to rising labour tax burdens a
at a roughly similar pace. While episodes of similar patterns between labour taxation
and debt developments may be observed in further countries (such as Sweden where
the labour tax indicators and the debt ratio moved almost in parallel), the charts only
in a few cases point to clearly divergent developments (e.g. in Belgium a decrease in
the debt ratio since the mid-1990's coincided with a secular increase in labour taxation).
ratios. It shows that the cross-country variation in both tax rates and debt ratios is
relatively large. For example, in 2008, the debt ratio ranged from around 15% of GDP
in Luxembourg to 106% in Italy. At the same time, the labour tax burden for a single
earner without children ranged from 15% in Ireland to 43% in Belgium and Denmark.
Overall, labour taxes for one-earner families with two children tend to be lower than
for single earners. The labour tax rate for a one-earner family with two children was
lowest in the Czech Republic (-7%, indicating a labour subsidy from the government)
and highest in Denmark and the Netherlands (29%). The chart points to a small posi-
tive correlation between the two variables, indicating that across this sample of 18 EU
countries high debt ratios also tend to go along with relatively high tax rates on labour.
Qualitatively similar results obtain when looking at tax wedges. While the causal in-
terpretation of this observation should not be over-emphasised, Section 3 provides an
in-depth analysis of the relation between labour taxation and general government debt.
10Corresponding charts for labour tax wedges are available upon request.
To allow for a rst illustrative assessment of this relationship, Figure 1 plots
year later. Five years later, the variables simultaneously reach their peaks and then decline
As a further illustrative exercise, Figure 2 plots tax burdens in 2008 against debt11
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Figure 1: Evolution of debt ratios and labour tax indicators over the last
three decades
Figure 1: Evolution of debt ratios and labour tax indicators over
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Note: For the denitions of tax burden and tax wedge see footnote for Table 1. For the denition of country
codes see footnote 7.
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Note: The regression line is based on a simple regression of tax burdens on debt ratios over the entire sample
period. The slope parameter of the debt ratio in both charts is around 0:1 with (cluster-robust) standard errors
of around 0:05. For the denitions of tax burden and tax wedge see footnote for Table 1. For the denition of
country codes see footnote 7.13
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3 Empirical Model
To analyse the impact of changes in the government debt burden on labour taxation




i;t 1 + kdi;t + kyi;t 1 + kwi;t 1 + kbi;t + 'kpi;t 1 + uk
i;t
where k
i;t refers to the respective indicator of labour taxation k (i.e. tax burden
for single earners, tax burden for a one-earner family with children, and tax wedges for
both categories) for country i in period t; ck
i is a country-specic intercept to account
for unobserved, time-invariant country characteristics that may be correlated with both
the dependent and the explanatory variables; k
i;t 1 is the lagged dependent variable,
included to allow for the possibility of tax smoothing, which suggests that governments
seek to keep distortive tax rates constant over time to minimise the inter-temporal ex-
cess burden. While the \strict" tax smoothing hypothesis, i.e. that the lagged tax rate
fully explains the current tax rate up to a white noise error term, has been challenged
empirically,11 it is generally found to exert a statistically signicant and economically
relevant impact. Since past taxing decisions and debt developments in turn are likely
to be interrelated, omitting k
i;t 1 thus could bias the results.12
The coecient of main interest is k which captures the response of labour taxation
to changes in the \debt burden"di;t.
subsets of specications presented below. In the rst group (Tables 2 and 3) it is mea-
sured as the debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of the previous year. In the second group
of specications (Tables 4 and 5), di;t is dened as the interest expenditure-to-GDP
ratio. This measure may indeed capture the constraining eect of higher debt bur-
dens on the budgetary room for manoeuvre more closely than debt-to-GDP ratios as
the debt servicing cost immediately enters the budget constraint.13 Moreover, govern-
ments' renancing costs as captured by the interest expenditure-to-GDP ratio account
for variations in interest rates which aect the budgetary position even when the debt
ratio is unchanged.
As a control variable, we include the primary scal balance net of labour tax rev-
enue as a percentage of GDP, bi;t, to control for the possibility that governments react
Furthermore, we include the lagged dependency ratio, pi;t 1, de-
ned as the number of persons older than 64 or younger than 15 as a percentage of
11See for example, Sahasakul (1986), Trehan and Walsh (1988), Roubini and Sachs (1989), Bizer
and Durlauf (1990, 1991), and Kenny and Toma (1997).
12To control for unobserved developments common to all countries that could aect both dependent
and explanatory variables, we included a linear time trend in several regressions. Furthermore, to
correct for the methodological dierence for computing labour tax indicators for the period before and
after 2000, we added a time dummy that is one from 2000 onwards and zero before 2000. Since neither
of these variables had a statistically signicant eect, they were not included in the nal specications.
13See e.g. Bernoth et al. (2004) and Bertola (2010).
The denition of the debt burden diers across the
to changes in the debt ratio also via budgetary items other than labour taxes (e.g. on
the expenditure side).14
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the working age population. A lower share of working-age persons implies that a given
level of labour tax revenue has to be generated from higher tax rates. At the same
time, the age structure is a commonly used proxy to capture voters' preferences on
scal policies and in our analysis serves to complement the xed eects which only
account for time-invariant preference heterogeneity.14 In addition, the rst lag of nom-
inal GDP growth is included since it might inuence the government's stance towards
distortionary taxation and at the same time aect developments in the debt and the
interest expenditure-to-GDP ratio. As another control variable, we include the rst
lag of nominal wage growth, wi;t 1, to account for the fact that in a progressive tax
system, changes in nominal wages may aect marginal labour tax rates and thus aver-
age taxation \mechanically" when households switch income brackets.
Given the drawbacks of the commonly used estimators for dynamic panel models
with unobserved heterogeneity, the below analysis uses a range of econometric pro-
cedures, including a least squares dummy variable (LSDV) estimator where the ex-
planatory scal variables (bi;t and di;t) are instrumented with several lags of their own
levels,15 a generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator (again treating all scal
variables as endogenous), and a bias-corrected least squares dummy variable (LSDVC)
estimator. Since each of these is subject to specic shortcomings, using a variety of
estimators may reduce the risk that the choice of econometric procedure unduly inu-
ences the main conclusions from the analysis.
14 See Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) for the seminal contribution to this literature and Overesch
and Rincke (2009) as well as Furceri and Karras (2010) for a similar choice of explanatory variables in
empirical analyses of tax policy in OECD countries.
15As regards the primary scal balance net of labour tax revenue, instrumentation appears war-
ranted since this variable is determined in parallel with labour tax policies in the budgetary process,
thus giving rise to immediate simultaneity concerns. Similar concerns apply to the lagged debt ratio
since governments are likely to bear in mind some type of inter-temporal budget constraint so that
future taxing decisions aect current policies and vice versa. Hence, also lagged scal variables might
be determined simultaneously with current tax rates and therefore should be instrumented, as well.
Instrumenting the scal variables with their own lags is a common response to this concern in the
related literature (see e.g. Gal  and Perotti, 2003). The strategy is based on the identifying assump-
tion that beyond a certain time horizon the interrelation between past and current policies becomes
negligible. In our specications, overidentication tests suggested a 2-lag structure for both the debt
Intuitively, the instru
mentation of the scal variables with two lags of their own levels may not appear sucient to fully
exclude that the coecients still capture some simultaneity between explanatory and dependent variables
arising from the inter-temporal nature of budgetary decisions. However, coecients did not display a
strong sensitivity to the inclusion of further lags in the instrument set.
and the primary balance less direct taxes variable, except for the tax burden for one-earner families
specification where two additional lags of the debt variable had to be included. -15
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4 Results and discussion
Table 2 reports the estimation results obtained from the LSDV estimator with the debt
ratio as the main explanatory variable.16 For each of the four labour tax indicators the
results point to a signicant positive response of labour taxation to rising debt ratios.
To be specic, an increase in the debt ratio by one percentage point on average raises
labour tax burdens by 0.04 percentage point for single earners and by 0.02 percentage
point for one-earner families in the subsequent year. Similar responses to changes in
the debt ratio are found for the labour tax wedges. As expected, labour taxation is
highly persistent with coecients of the lagged dependent variables ranging from 0.68
to 0.84. As a consequence, the long-run eect of an increase in the debt ratio is sub-
stantially stronger than the short-run impact, with coecients amounting to between
0.12 and 0.14.17 Based on the OECD estimates for annual gross earnings these coe-
cients can be translated into the reduction in net income that is caused by the typical
labour tax response to a change in debt. For example, a one percentage point rise in
the debt-to-GDP ratio goes along with an increase in the labour tax burden of a single
earner (one-earner family) by around e14 (e7) in the subsequent year at the euro
area average; over the long run, the associated cumulative increase in the tax burden
would go to e44 (e41).
As Table 2 shows, the coecients of the primary balance net of direct taxes display
a signicant negative impact across all labour tax indicators, indicating that an im-
provement in a country's budgetary position tends to reduce the level of distortionary
labour taxation. Moreover, the dependency ratio displays a statistically signicant
positive eect across all labour tax indicators (except for the tax burden for single
earners where the p-value is just above 0.10). This suggests that the higher the share
of non-working age people in the economy the stronger the tendency for governments to
increase labour taxation. The additional control variables do not display statistically
signicant coecients.
The relevant specication tests support the identication strategy. The instrumen-
tal variables pass the overidentication test; the null hypothesis of weak instruments
is clearly rejected; and in several specications we reject the null hypothesis that the
instrumented variables are exogenous or the p-values of the corresponding test statistic
are only slightly above 10% thus suggesting the use of instrumental variable estimation.
As pointed out by Nickell (1981), the LSDV estimator is not consistent in au-
toregressive dynamic panel data specications. The resulting bias tends to decrease
with the time dimension of the panel (which is relatively large in our dataset) and
16The econometric analysis was performed using Stata.
17The long-term coecient is dened as the short-term coecient of the debt variable divided by one
minus the coecient of the lagged dependent variable. It measures the cumulated long-term response
of the respective labour tax indictor to a change in the debt variable that is not reversed in subsequent
years.16
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1307
March 2011
Table 2: Regression results based on least squares dummy variables estimator
(debt ratio as main explanatory variable)
Tax burden Tax wedges
single one-earner single one-earner
earner family earner family
Lagged dependent variable 0.69*** 0.84*** 0.68*** 0.83***
(0.09) (0.02) (0.08) (0.04)
Debt ratio (rst lag) 0.04** 0.02* 0.04** 0.03*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Primary balance ratio net of direct taxes -0.15*** -0.23*** -0.13** -0.19***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Dependency ratio (rst lag) 0.12 0.13** 0.12* 0.11*
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Growth rate (rst lag) 0.02 -0.01 0.06 0.05
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05)
Wage rate (rst lag) 0.05 0.04 -0.00 -0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Debt ratio (long-run coecient) 0.13*** 0.12** 0.12*** 0.14**
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06)
Observations 399 371 385 383
Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying 0.81 0.29 0.87 0.23
restrictions (p-value)
Dierence in Sargan/Hansen test for 0.05 0.33 0.05 0.19
endogenous regressor (p-value)
Kleinbergen-Paap rk Wald F-Statistic 204.3 103.0 210.3 247.5
Note: All estimates are obtained from two-stage least squares estimation including country- and time-xed eects. Excluded
instruments for the lagged debt ratio and the primary balance less direct taxes are the rst two lags of these variables. In the
estimation of the tax burden for one-earner families four lags of the debt ratio variable are included to pass the overidentication
test. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, * signicant at 10%
level. For the denitions of tax burden and tax wedge see footnote for Table 1.
primarily aects the coecient of the lagged dependent variable whereas the other
coecients (which are of main interest for our analysis) are less aected. Hence, the
results reported in Table 2 may serve as an interesting starting point for gauging the
eect of changes in the debt ratio on labour taxation. However, Monte Carlo simula-
tions suggest that even for relatively long panels the Nickell bias may still be sizeable.18
To address these robustness concerns, we test alternative estimators. Given the
high persistence in the dependent variable, the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) estimator
(which would be a natural starting point for this analysis) only produces very weak
instruments in our sample. While we tested GMM estimation techniques as an alterna-
tive option, this approach carries the risk of proliferation and weakness of instruments
due to the large time dimension of our panel relative to its cross section. This in turn
would reinforce the dynamic panel bias aecting the LSDV estimates.19 This problem
18For example, Judson and Owen (1999) show that for a sample size and structure comparable to
ours the relative bias may still amount up to 20% of the true coecient for the explanatory variables.
19See Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) for the seminal contri-
butions to the literature on GMM estimation. See Roodman (2009) for a discussion of the common17
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is likely to remain relevant even when strongly restricting the number of instrumental
variables. For illustrative purposes, Table A.1 in the Annex presents the Arellano-
Bond (1991) dierence GMM estimator limiting the instrument set to the rst lags
of the variables to be instrumented. For all labour tax indicators the coecient for
the lagged dependent variable is substantially below the one obtained from the LSDV
specication. The coecients for the lagged debt ratio, ranging between 0.05 and 0.07,
in turn are markedly above the LSDV estimates. Since we would theoretically expect
the Nickell bias to be negative for the lagged dependent variable and positive for the
debt ratio,20 these results indicate that GMM estimation indeed may not be suitable
to eliminate the bias suspected for the LSDV estimates.
As an alternative way to address the Nickell bias while avoiding the above pitfalls of
GMM estimation, we re-estimate the model using the bias-corrected LSDV estimator
for unbalanced panels (LSDVC) developed and implemented in Stata by Bruno (2005),
which explicitly corrects coecient estimates for an approximation of the bias term.21
timation, with the coecient of the lagged debt ratio again ranging from 0.02 to 0.04.
The estimated coecients for the lagged dependent variables are somewhat above the
ones estimated in the LSDV specication, which is consistent with the conjecture that
the latter may be biased. The long-run coecients of the debt ratio also exceed those
found in the LSDV specication, except for the regression on the tax burden for single
earners where it has the same value. The coecients for the control variables are of
the same sign and of a broadly similar magnitude.
These results also merit discussion. In particular, the advantage of the corrected
LSDV estimator has to be traded-o against the drawback that it does not allow for
endogenous regressors apart from the lagged dependent variable. Hence, we need to
assume that governments' decisions are not subject to an inter-temporal budget con-
straint, thus taking past scal policy as independent of today's taxing decision which
might contrast with intuition. Yet, given that the coecients of main interest only
dier little between the two specications we suspect that ignoring potential interde-
pendencies of policy choices across time does not severely aect results in the context
of the present analysis.
As discussed in section 3, interest payments are an additional relevant factor in
determining the need for governments to respond to deteriorating scal positions.
Therefore, Tables 4 and 5 present estimates for the LSDV and bias-corrected LSDV
specications in which now the debt-to-GDP ratio has been replaced by the interest
payments-to-GDP ratio as the main explanatory variable. While overall the results are
qualitatively unchanged, the coecients of the interest payments are markedly higher
pitfalls of GMM estimation for panels with a large time dimension relative to its cross section.
20See Nickell (1981) for derivations of the direction of the dynamic panel bias.
21This estimator provides an extension of methods developed by Kiviet (1995, 1999), Judson and
Owen (1999), and Bun and Kiviet (2003) to unbalanced panels.
As shown in Table 3, results are qualitatively similar to those obtained from LSDV es-18
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Table 3: Regression results based on bias-corrected least squares dummy
variables estimator (debt ratio as main explanatory variable)
Tax burden Tax wedges
single one-earner single one-earner
earner family earner family
Lagged dependent variable 0.79*** 0.89*** 0.75*** 0.89***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04)
Debt ratio (rst lag) 0.03*** 0.02** 0.04*** 0.02**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Primary balance ratio net of direct taxes -0.10*** -0.17*** -0.09*** -0.13***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Dependency ratio (rst lag) 0.06* 0.07* 0.05 0.05
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Growth rate (rst lag) 0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.01
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Wage rate (rst lag) 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Debt ratio (long-run coecient) 0.13*** 0.18*** 0.15*** 0.19***
(0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.06)
Observations 413 413 398 398
Note: Bias correction is initialised by Arrelano Bond estimator. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Bias correction
up to order O(1=NT2). *** signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, * signicant at 10% level. For the denitions of
tax burden and tax wedge see footnote for Table 1.
than for the debt ratio. In the LSDV specication a one percentage point increase
in the interest expenditure-to-GDP ratio is associated with an increase in the labour
tax indicators between 0.17 (for the tax burden of single earners) and 0.24 (for the tax
wedge of one-earner families). In the bias corrected LSDV estimates the coecients are
similar ranging from 0.16 to 0.22. The long-run coecients are also clearly above those
for the debt ratio, reaching a maximum of 1.76 in the regression for the tax burden for
one-earner families. Again translating this into the impact on an average household,
the associated cumulative increase in the tax burden would amount to almost e600.19
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1307
March 2011
Table 4: Regression results based on least squares dummy variables estimator
(interest expenditure ratio as main explanatory variable)
Tax burden Tax wedges
single one-earner single one-earner
earner family earner family
Lagged dependent variable 0.77*** 0.82*** 0.72*** 0.81***
(0.05) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03)
Interest expenditure ratio (rst lag) 0.17** 0.23* 0.22** 0.24***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Primary balance ratio net of direct taxes -0.15*** -0.22*** -0.12** -0.18***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
Dependency ratio (rst lag) 0.13* 0.19*** 0.16** 0.19***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Growth rate (rst lag) -0.00 -0.03 0.03 0.02
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Wage rate (rst lag) -0.03 -0.01 -0.07*** -0.08**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.04)
Interest expenditure ratio (long-run coecient) 0.71*** 1.30*** 0.79*** 1.26***
(0.30) (0.44) (0.23) (0.45)
Observations 400 370 386 344
Sargan/Hansen test of overidentifying 0.34 0.33 0.23 0.23
restrictions (p-value)
Dierence in Sargan/Hansen test for 0.13 0.43 0.19 0.47
endogenous regressor (p-value)
Kleinbergen-Paap rk Wald F-Statistic 208.2 100.9 271.4 215.8
Note: All estimates are obtained from two-stage least squares estimation including country- and time-xed eects. Excluded
instruments for the lagged interest expenditure ratio and the primary balance less direct taxes are the rst two lags of these
variables. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, * signicant at
10% level. For the denitions of tax burden and tax wedge see footnote for Table 1.
Table 5: Regression results based on bias-corrected least squares dummy
variables estimator (interest expenditure ratio as main explanatory variable)
Tax burden Tax wedges
single one-earner single one-earner
earner family earner family
Lagged dependent variable 0.83*** 0.88*** 0.79*** 0.88***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
Interest expenditure ratio (rst lag) 0.16*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.18**
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Primary balance ratio net of direct taxes -0.09*** -0.16*** -0.07** -0.12***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Dependency ratio (rst lag) 0.08** 0.12** 0.09** 0.09**
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Growth rate (rst lag) -0.03 -0.03 0.00 -0.01
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Wage rate (rst lag) 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.01
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Interest expenditure ratio (long-run coecient) 0.94*** 1.76*** 1.03*** 1.56***
(0.24) (0.44) (0.26) (0.48)
Observations 413 413 398 398
Note: Bias correction is initialised by Arrelano Bond estimator. Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. Bias correction
up to order O(1=NT2). *** signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, * signicant at 10% level. For the denitions of
tax burden and tax wedge see footnote for Table 1.20
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5 Conclusions
This paper investigates the relationship between general government gross debt and
labour taxation for a panel of 18 EU countries over the period 1979-2008. The degree
of distortionary labour taxation is proxied by the composite OECD indicators of the
tax burden and the tax wedge, both for single earners and one earner families with
two children at average income levels. Our econometric estimates show a systematic
positive response of labour taxation to changes in debt ratios and to changes in the
interest expenditure governments have to pay on their debt.
Available information on the EU countries' exit strategy to the crisis seems to sug-
gest that several countries target higher consumption taxes to consolidate their public
nances. Against this background, an extension of the analysis presented in this paper
would be to more specically model the overall composition of budgetary adjustment
in response to sustainability shocks in a dynamic framework.
Appendix
Table A.1: Regression results based on dierence GMM estimator
Tax burden Tax wedges
single one-earner single one-earner
earner family earner family
Lagged dependent variable 0.54*** 0.71*** 0.31 0.68***
(0.15) (0.09) (0.23) (0.09)
Debt ratio (rst lag) 0.05** 0.04** 0.07** 0.04*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Primary balance ratio net of direct taxes -0.18*** -0.22*** -0.10 -0.25***
(0.05) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07)
Dependency ratio (rst lag) 0.06 0.14 0.13 0.07
(0.09) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Growth rate (rst lag) 0.10** 0.10* 0.14** 0.12*
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Wage rate (rst lag) -0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.01
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Observations 395 395 380 380
AR test (H0=no autocorrelation)
AR(1) p-value 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00
AR(2) p-value 0.17 0.31 0.14 0.15
Note: Instrument set is limited to the rst lag of the instrumented variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
** signicant at 1% level, ** signicant at 5% level, * signicant at 10% level. For the denitions of tax burden and tax wedge
see footnote for Table 1.21
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